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Indigenous Management Strategies and Socioeconomic 
Impacts of Yartsa Gunbu (Ophiocordyceps sinensis) 
Harvesting in Nubri and Tsum, Nepal
The harvesting and selling of yartsa gunbu 
(literally ‘summer grass, winter worm’; 
Ophiocordyceps sinensis) is contributing to 
economic and social transformations across 
the Tibetan Plateau and Himalayan region 
faster than any development scheme could 
envision. Meanwhile, the rising demand for the 
commodity has been linked to violence and 
environmental degradation, and has generated 
concerns over resource sustainability. Although 
good data is emerging on harvesting practices, 
medical uses, and the booming market for 
yartsa gunbu, especially in Tibetan areas of 
China, little systematic research has explored 
village-level management practices and 
socioeconomic impacts. This paper seeks to 
partially fill that void through a case study of 
the yartsa gunbu harvest in Nubri and Tsum, 
contiguous valleys in Nepal inhabited by ethnic 
Tibetans. Using data from household surveys 
and in-depth interviews, the authors describe 
the process of gathering and selling yartsa 
gunbu within the parameters of management 
practices that combine religious and secular 
regulations over natural resources. The authors 
conclude with a discussion of the indigenous 
management system in relation to sustainable 
development. 
Keywords: Nepal, Tibetans, caterpillar fungus, Ophiocordyceps 
sinensis, yartsa gunbu, natural resource management, 
sustainable development.
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Although bikas (development) has been a central 
component of Nepal’s national narrative since the 1960s 
(Pigg 1992; Des Chene 1996; Onta 1996), some parts of the 
country, including highland communities populated by 
ethnic Tibetans, have benefitted very little from state-
initiated development projects. In Nubri and Tsum, 
contiguous valleys in northern Gorkha District that border 
China’s Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR), the state failed 
to develop basic services like health care facilities and 
schools beyond a rudimentary level. Despite being by-
passed by development, residents of these valleys are now 
reaping economic rewards that were unthinkable a decade 
ago. They are doing so by devising strategies to regulate a 
lucrative resource, yartsa gunbu (literally ‘summer grass, 
winter worm’; Ophiocordyceps sinensis, also known as 
‘caterpillar fungus’), in a way that resembles an indigenous 
form of ‘sustainable development’. 
Yartsa gunbu is endemic to the grasslands and alpine 
regions of the Tibetan Plateau and surrounding valleys of 
the Himalaya (Winkler 2008a). The fungus parasitizes and 
mummifies the earth-dwelling larva of several Thitarodes 
ghost moth species to form a fungus-caterpillar complex.1 
The use of yartsa gunbu in Tibetan and Chinese medicine 
has a long history. Today yartsa gunbu is widely traded as 
a powerful tonic in Chinese medicine, is often referred to 
as ‘Himalayan Viagra’ in the media,2 and has become such 
an important commodity that scholars nominated it to be 
China’s national fungus (Zhang et al. 2012: 2-3).
With an eight-fold increase in value from ¥4,800 to ¥40,000 
per pound (Winkler 2008b: 18) yartsa gunbu has become 
the mainstay of household economies across the Tibetan 
Plateau and in the highlands of Nepal, India, and Bhutan. 
It fills an economic void in Tibetan areas of China that 
state-sponsored development projects, which tend to focus 
on infrastructure, do not always satisfy. Winkler points 
out, “Unlike many other natural resources in the region, 
such as timber, gold and also increasingly hydroelectricity, 
where the profits are captured by the state sector, fungal 
income (and other income from wild collected plants) goes 
directly to rural households” (2005: 77). The yartsa gunbu 
harvest neither interferes with other economic activities 
nor requires sophisticated technology and capital. “Thus,” 
Winkler argues, “resource access is assured to the people, 
who are otherwise marginalized by government control of 
local resources such as timber, by lack of formal education, 
lack of access to credit, etc.” (2005: 77).
In addition to bringing economic benefits, the yartsa 
gunbu harvest can have negative consequences such as 
the degradation of pasturelands and violence (Devkota 
2010: 96; Gruschke 2011: 227; Yeh and Lama 2013: 8). In 
recent incidents, in June 2014 a clash with police in Dolpo 
left two dead in a dispute between members of the local 
community and a National Park Buffer Zone Management 
Committee over who has the right to collect and keep fees 
paid by outsiders for access to yartsa gunbu grounds (The 
Record 2014). On 30 May 2013, at least two people died in 
a fight between Tibetan groups in the area of Rebgong, 
China (RFA 2013). This event prompted the Dalai Lama to 
issue a rare plea to Tibetans to shun violence and draw 
upon traditional values and practices to resolve territorial 
issues of access. 
Despite yartsa gunbu’s importance to rural economies 
and potential links to social discord, environmental 
degradation, and economic dependency, there is still a 
lot we do not know about its impact on highland Tibetan 
communities of Nepal. This paper describes the situation 
in Nubri and Tsum where yartsa gunbu has been collected 
by local medical practitioners for centuries, but only 
became a critical part of people’s household economies 
within the last decade. Following a literature review, 
we use Nubri and Tsum as case studies to illustrate how 
some communities are dealing with a phenomenon that is 
transforming people’s lives faster than any development 
scheme could envision.
Overview of Management Practices
Our literature review reveals a patchwork of management 
practices across the Tibetan Plateau and Himalayan 
region. Many areas permit outsiders to collect yartsa gunbu 
providing they pay a fee. This is the case in Dolpa, Nepal 
(Devkota 2010; Knight 2012; Shrestha and Bawa 2013), 
Kumaon, India (Garbyal et al., 2004), Dongwa Village in 
Yunnan (Stewart 2014), and some counties in China’s TAR 
where non-residents can purchase permits ranging from 
¥300-¥1,500 Yuan ($40-$200) (Winkler 2008a). In Domkhok 
Township, Qinghai, households lease land to outsiders 
for fees ranging from ¥10,000-¥15,000 ($1,300-$2,000) per 
person. One area is controlled by four households who 
only permit 80 outsiders to gather each season. By leasing 
land during the picking season each household receives 
¥200,000 ($26,600) (Sulek 2012). Some places in Qinghai 
(Gruschke 2008, 2011; Yeh and Lama 2013) and Kumaon 
(Garbyal et al., 2004) initially permitted collection of 
yartsa gunbu by outsiders, but later imposed restrictions. 
Exclusionary practices have benefitted Tibetans in one 
area by opening new opportunities to act as middlemen in 
the trade (Gruschke 2011: 225). Others areas, such as  
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Riwoche and Tengchen Counties in the TAR, closed their 
gathering grounds to outsiders early on (Winkler 2008a).
In Nagchu and Nyingtri Prefectures of the TAR, Winkler 
(2008b) reports that people from the more densely 
populated Shigatse Prefecture are permitted to collect 
yartsa gunbu. Other scholars confirmed this while 
conducting research in Shigatse Prefecture on seasonal 
labor migration (Goldstein et al. 2008). In 2006, one 
man reported that he traveled annually to Nagchu with 
a contractor from a neighboring village. Being well-
connected in the nomad region through his work, Nagchu 
residents permitted the contractor to participate in the 
yartsa gumbu harvest. He assigned four of his workers 
to the task, for which they were paid their normal 
construction wage of ¥28 per day ($3.70). The contractor 
relinquished half of the harvest to locals and sold the other 
half on the open market for a net profit of over $5,000. In 
contrast, Stewart (2014) reports that road construction 
crews have overwhelmed local efforts to exclude outsiders 
in Shusong Village, Yunnan, to the point where their 
gathering is now unregulated.
In the area surrounding China’s Baima Xueshan Nature 
Reserve in Yunnan Province, Weckerle and colleagues 
(2010) report that, although it is technically illegal to 
harvest yartsa gunbu in the nature preserve, authorities 
are unwilling to enforce a restriction on such an important 
income source for local families. Village committees along 
with the nature reserve’s staff implemented regulations to 
permit camping only at designated sites where all garbage 
must be collected and burned, prohibit cutting trees for 
fuel, and mandate that all holes made by extracting yartsa 
gunbu must be repaired. 
Bhutan is the only country to institute a national-level 
management strategy (Cannon et al. 2009). In 2004 the 
government relaxed laws on gathering yartsa gunbu in 
order to provide locals with an incentive to police their 
areas and protect natural resources. The government 
permitted yak herders who normally graze in an area 
where yartsa gunbu is found to collect during June; only 
one member per household could participate. In 2008 the 
limitation on collectors per household was relaxed and 
more decision-making power delegated to the local level 
(Cannon et al. 2009: 2272-2273). Bhutan’s government 
legislated that yartsa gunbu can only be sold at authorized 
auctions by authorized collectors. Buyers must be 
Bhutanese nationals who could sell to international or 
domestic markets. The government imposes a 4.9% levy 
on sales to cover the expenses of auctions and to support 
environmental protection programs (Cannon et al. 2009).
Selling the Product 
In Tibetan areas of China the yartsa gunbu market is 
unregulated. Collectors sell to middlemen of their choice 
who come directly to gathering sites or conduct their 
business in nearby market towns. Some sell their product 
before cleaning it, which provides less profit but requires 
less effort, whereas others increase profits by cleaning 
and drying the yartsa gunbu first (Winkler 2008a). Yeh 
and Lama (2013: 11) describe how some transactions 
are conducted in the traditional Tibetan manner of 
exchanging hand signals, veiled from public view, within 
each other’s long sleeves.3 
In primary collection areas of Chamdo and Nagchu 
Prefectures,TAR, Winkler (2009) estimates that yartsa 
gunbu accounts for 70-90% of household cash incomes. In 
Domkhok Township, Qinghai, some households are able 
to earn ¥200,000 ($26,600) per season by either collecting 
themselves or leasing access to outside collectors; those 
who sell their herds and live mainly off yartsa gunbu fare 
just as well as those who continue to keep large yak and 
sheep herds. Therefore, many nomads are reducing herd 
sizes or eliminating livestock altogether because herding 
requires far more annual labor than collecting yartsa gunbu 
(Sulek 2012). A similar process seems to be occurring 
in Bhutan. Profits ranged from $38 to $2,541 with top 
collectors earning nearly the equivalent of a teacher’s 
annual salary for little over a month’s work, prompting 
some to buy land at lower altitude in anticipation of one 
day giving up herding altogether (Cannon et al. 2009). 
Tibetans in China use yartsa gunbu profits to start entre-
preneurial activities, such as shops, or as a means to secure 
bank loans (Winkler 2008b, 2009; Gruschke 2011). Others 
use the income to invest in cattle and jewelry (Gruschke 
2008), cover healthcare expenses, improve the condition 
of their housing, buy motorcycles and other items such as 
televisions and DVD players (Winkler 2008a, 2008b; Sulek 
2012). In addition, some take the opportunity to gain merit 
in a culturally appropriate manner by making large dona-
tions to monasteries (Winkler 2008a). In Bhutan, collectors 
use their income to pay school fees or buy items like solar 
panels and mobile phones (Cannon et al. 2009). 
This overview indicates that management practices and 
economic impacts vary across the region. In areas where 
yartsa gunbu is found, people can realize profits far beyond 
their income from farming and herding. Tibetans are using 
the cash to improve their standard of living, and in some 
cases are reducing dependency on agro-pastoral activities 
by becoming entrepreneurs. Thus, the yartsa gunbu trade 
is transforming social and economic life in ways that 
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development initiatives in China and the highlands of 
surrounding nations have been unable to match. However, 
Yeh and Lama argue that the trade may act to further 
marginalize Tibetans in China by “making them highly 
vulnerable to the whims of Chinese urban consumer 
demands through a narrowing of livelihood options” (2013: 
3). Other scholars express concern over the sustainability 
of the harvest (Sharma 2004; Cannon et al. 2009; Stewart 
2009; Winkler 2009, 2012; Weckerle et al. 2010; Shrestha 
and Bawa 2013). In contrast, in this article we provide 
details on the ways that residents of two valleys in Nepal 
have devised a set of regulations that are equitable and 
potentially sustainable.
Yartsa Gunbu in Nubri and Tsum
Although it may be true in some parts of Nepal that, 
“restrictions on harvest have been unsuccessful” (Shrestha 
and Bawa 2013: 519), evidence from Nubri and Tsum 
can provide a counterpoint to this general claim. The 
contiguous valleys of Nubri and Tsum are inhabited by 
ethnic Tibetans who until recently made their living 
primarily through farming, herding, and trans-Himalayan 
trade (see Figure 1). Agricultural land is privately owned, 
and is acquired through patrilineal inheritance. In 
exchange for paying taxes to the village administration 
and local temples, land-owning households have the right 
to exploit communal resources which include forests and 
high altitude pastures. The right to use pastures is critical, 
because that is where yartsa gunbu can be found.
Tsum is divided into two VDCs (Village Development 
Committees).4 Chhekampar, the upper VDC, is comprised 
of 11 villages with a population of roughly 1,500. Only 
residents of Chhekampar have access rights to the pastures 
where yartsa gunbu is found. Nubri consists of four VDCs. 
The highest, Samagaun, consists of two villages (Sama and 
Samdo, population 778) which have abundant high altitude 
pastures and thereby access to the most fertile yartsa gunbu 
areas in the valley. The next highest VDC, Lho (population 
roughly 1,000), has limited pastures and hence much less 
yartsa gunbu. The two lowest VDCs, Prok and Bihi, have 
very few pastures where yartsa gunbu is found. 
The research for this paper was undertaken in 2011 and 
2012.5 In 2011 we spent five weeks in Nubri studying 
migration, family management practices, and household 
economic strategies. In Sama, one of several research 
villages, we conducted in-depth interviews with 18 house-
holders (nine men and nine women) ranging in age from 
31 to 53 (average age of 41.3). Each interview was conduct-
ed in Tibetan and included questions about yartsa gunbu: 
who gathered it, how much they earned, how they spent 
the money, and perceived impacts on the community. We 
also interviewed two elderly lamas (age 75 and 79) and one 
young lama (age 36), as well as two village leaders. Some 
clarifying information was obtained during subsequent 
visits and phone conversations. 
The economic data presented in this paper comes from 
the 2012 Household Survey of Nubri, Tsum, and Mustang 
Figure 1. Map showing 
location of Nubri and 
Tsum in Nepal.
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conducted by Cynthia Beall, Geoff Childs and Sienna Craig. 
The survey gathered demographic information on every 
individual in the study area, and economic information 
on every household including how much money they had 
made from the previous yartsa gunbu harvest. We also 
spent time in the yartsa gunbu camps and thereby gathered 
first-hand information at the primary harvesting sites. 
All residents of Tsum’s Chhekampar VDC, which include 
anyone who was born in a local household regardless 
of where they currently reside, have the right to gather 
yartsa gunbu on communal grazing grounds located one-
day’s walking distance from any village. Thus, a man or 
woman who was born in Chhekampar VDC but now lives 
in Kathmandu, India, or any other country has the right 
to return and participate in the harvest. The patrilineal 
assignment of collection rights is highlighted by the fact 
that local men’s wives who are not born in Tsum can 
participate, whereas local women’s husbands who are not 
born in Tsum and are not residing in the territory cannot. 
All other non-residents are prohibited from gathering 
yarts gunbu on VDC territory. Previously, non-residents 
from villages below Chhekampar VDC could pay a fee to 
gather, but locals barred them in 2010 due to concerns 
over crowding and fighting in the camps and the presence 
of outsiders during the harvest season when many houses 
are left empty. Security of personal property outweighed 
any income gained through the issuance of permits. The 
only non-residents who can gather are household servants 
who have lived in Chhekampar VDC continuously for at 
least one year, and, as mentioned above, non-resident 
wives of local men. 
Other than excluding outsiders, the collection process is 
not tightly regulated in Tsum. According to data gathered 
through interviews and first-hand observation, residents 
of the uppermost villages travel to the gathering grounds 
in April and report back when they see evidence that yartsa 
gunbu is emerging. Afterwards, people begin establishing 
camps in highland pastures that they use for summer graz-
ing. Shelters range from typical herding huts with stone 
walls covered by woolen tents, to plastic tarps stretched 
over bamboo poles. In order to share logistics people travel 
and camp in groups comprised of friends and relatives. 
Parents recall sons and daughters attending distant 
boarding schools to help with the harvest. The majority 
of householders participate—even pregnant women who 
sometimes give birth at the camps. Only small children, 
the elderly, monks and nuns, and a few families of heredi-
tary lamas do not collect yartsa gunbu. 
People from Tsum sell their product to middlemen from 
Tibet. Most people use their income, which ranged from 
NRs2,000-NRs300,000 in 2011 ($24 to $3,530) to buy food 
and clothing from markets in TAR, China. As a result, 
consumption habits have changed; people eat more rice 
and display their wealth status by serving visitors pow-
dered milk and coffee. Although Tsum’s residents do not 
have a custom of depositing money into savings accounts, 
some purchase gold and other types of jewelry which are 
not only status symbols but a way of storing wealth. Locals 
are also building new homes and renovating old ones, and 
showing an entrepreneurial spirit by building lodges that 
cater to foreign tourists. 
Traditionally, Tsum’s residents were reluctant to gather 
yartsa gunbu on the grounds that doing so constituted 
the killing of a living being. According to a local saying, 
“Digging up one worm is equivalent to killing one fully 
ordained monk.”6 Nowadays, however, 83% of household 
Figure 2. Yartsa 
gunbu collectors’ 
shelter, Tsum.
(Geoff Childs, 2012)
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Figure 4. Sama Village, Nubri.
(Geoff Childs, 2012)
Figure 3. Cleaning yartsa gunbu 
prior to sale, Tsum.
(Geoff Childs, 2012)
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non-farm income in Tsum comes through the collection 
and sale of yartsa gunbu (see Table 1). A strong economic 
incentive has prevailed over the aversion to commit what 
was once considered a harmful action that would provoke 
negative consequences.7
In comparison, yartsa gunbu collection is more 
systematically controlled in Nubri’s Samagaun VDC where 
management practices involve a combination of village 
regulations (yul khrims) and religious regulations (chos 
khrims). Until now, the local VDC government has taken 
responsibility for devising and implementing management 
practices and regulations.8 Samagaun’s leaders recognized 
early on that some regulations could help ensure an 
equitable and sustainable harvest. Based on the amount 
of snow cover in the highland pastures and other factors, 
village leaders set a date for the commencement of the 
harvest. In the weeks prior to the official starting date 
every able-bodied resident must physically check in at 
the community meeting house four times daily (7:00am, 
10:00am, 2:00pm, and 6:00pm). The roll call is designed 
to thwart attempts by any individual to begin collecting 
earlier than others. Anybody who fails to check in or is 
caught venturing to the high pastures before the starting 
date incurs a heavy fine. Village leaders also have the 
authority to postpone collection when conditions warrant. 
For example, in 2012 the best areas were still covered by 
snow in late May so leaders suspending the harvest for a 
week in order to allow conditions to improve.
Yartsa gunbu is found on a common resource (pastureland) 
and therefore is treated as a common resource. The right 
to gather yartsa gunbu is held by any bona fide resident 
of the village, a status defined through participation in a 
household taxation system (Childs 2005). Each household 
must register its collectors with the village administration 
and pay a yartsa gunbu tax of NRs100 ($1.20) for the first 
household member and NRs4,500 ($53) for each additional 
member. The money is spent on common purposes, such 
as inviting a lama to perform a communal empowerment 
ritual (dbang), repairing the hydroelectric system, or 
paying litigation costs when disputes arise with other 
villages. To guard against outside poachers, the village 
pays a few men a daily salary to guard the richest 
harvesting grounds. 
Religious regulations (chos khrims) are mechanisms 
designed to prevent people from exploiting resources in 
sacred areas. For example, Gang Pungyen (Mt. Manaslu, 
8,156m) is considered to be the residence of Sama’s 
protector deity (yul lha). Lamas in Sama shield certain 
tracts of land on the slopes of Gang Pungyen through 
‘sealing decrees’ (shag rgya) that prohibit people from 
cutting trees, gathering forest products, or hunting 
wildlife.9 Recently, Sama’s lamas added yartsa gunbu 
collection to the list of prohibited activities in designated 
sacred areas (see also Winkler 2008b; Boesi and Cardi 2009).
Yartsa gunbu has become such an important contributor 
to household economies that during harvest season 
local schools shut down and parents recall to the village 
children who are living elsewhere. As one man stated, 
In our village, all recent developments and rises 
in income are due to the collection of yartsa 
gunbu. That is why, if there are four members 
in a household, all four will go. If there are five 
members, all five will go. Everyone engages in the 
harvest, regardless of whether they are a lama, 
layperson, or village leader.
Like in Tsum, the people of Nubri sell their yartsa gunbu 
to middlemen from Tibet who pay in cash; competition 
among middlemen continually drives the price upwards. 
Several young residents of Sama facilitate the trade and 
increase their profits by taking interest-free loans from 
a middleman, buying yartsa gunbu from fellow villagers, 
and then selling the product back to the money lender. 
Middlemen use this strategy to capture a greater share of 
the market.
In 2011 the most successful households made around 
NRs400,000 ($4,700) from yartsa gunbu. However, fortunes 
vary because some people are more adept at collecting 
than others. One woman complained that her son is an 
VDC (Valley) Yartsa Gunbu Income Total Income (Includes Remittances)
% of Total Income 
from Yartsa Gunbu
Lho (Nubri) NRs 12,800 ($151) NRs 13,900 ($164) 92.1%
Chhekampar (Tsum) NRs 40,900 ($481) NRs 49,300 ($580) 83.0%
Samagaun (Nubri) NRs 69,400 ($816) NRs 90,200 ($1,061) 76.9%
Table 1. Average 
Income per 
Household by  
Source and Village.
Beall, Childs, and 
Craig, 2012 Nubri, 
Tsum, and Mustang 
Household Survey
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incompetent collector and lamented, “What rotten luck! 
Some individuals can find one or two thousand pieces, but 
we could manage a mere 375. The money we got only last-
ed for a month. That’s all.” Nevertheless, even a relatively 
low tally garners a significant influx of cash considering 
that, prior to yartsa gunbu, the most lucrative income gen-
erating activity was ferrying mountain climbers’ loads to 
Manaslu Base Camp for NRs1,500 ($18) per trip.
Table 1 demonstrates that yartsa gunbu provides the 
majority of income for the residents of the three VDCs 
where yartsa gunbu is found, but also shows considerable 
variation.10 Samagaun has the most abundant highland 
pastures and therefore profits the most from the harvest. 
Instant Income: Pros and Cons
There is no question that yartsa gunbu has brought a much 
needed economic boost to Nubri and Tsum. The valleys 
were relatively wealthy prior to the 1960s due to their 
position along trans-Himalayan trade routes (Snellgrove 
1989). However, the development of a road system on 
the Tibetan Plateau combined with frequent border 
closings eroded trade. By the 1990s the only way people 
in Nubri could make ends meet was to sell timber across 
the border to Tibet. People lamented at that time, “We 
trade or we starve” (Childs 2004). Nowadays, most people 
we interviewed use at least some of their income to fulfill 
subsistence needs. One man from Sama explained,
There is no other source of cash income in the 
village.11 The yearly produce from land is not 
enough to feed us even when we include dairy 
products. In the past, people would make do 
with little income. These days, even with more 
cash, people still fall short. Nevertheless, in the 
yartsa gunbu era people have plenty to eat and 
good clothes to wear. They can use the money to 
buy rice, grain, butter, clothes, shoes, salt, and 
everything from Tibet.
The income is especially important for poorer families 
who have little land and cannot produce enough food for 
the entire year, but can now purchase food from Tibet. 
For example, a woman living in one of the poorer house-
holds in Sama stated that she and her husband made about 
NRs100,000 ($1,176) from yartsa gunbu. When we asked 
what she did with the income, she responded,
I feed my family with this money. That’s it. We 
don’t have much land so we can’t invest it in 
farming, and it is not enough to buy animals. So we 
pick yartsa gunbu and from that money we run our 
household. If we could get lots of money, we could 
save it for a child’s education but the money is only 
enough to feed us.
Similar to Tsum, some people use the income to finance 
house construction or buy jewelry. One man said he 
uses some of his income to purchase more bovines, and 
noted that yartsa gunbu is partially responsible for the 
recent increase in herd sizes. A Sama resident also stated, 
“Parents are taking more responsibility for their children 
who are in [boarding] school. They take interest in the 
children’s diet and clothing. They won’t just ignore the 
children once they had been admitted in school and 
receive sponsorship.”
The newfound wealth also contributes to religious life. 
Some people reported using their money to gain merit 
by sponsoring rituals or embarking on pilgrimages. One 
man noted that people are becoming more generous and 
making larger donations to monasteries. We observed that 
annual religious festivals have become more elaborate 
as evidenced by the higher quality costumes worn by 
participants, and the higher value donations of food and 
material items. Because some of these festivals effectively 
redistribute food during the lean part of the year (Childs 
2005), the benefits of sponsoring communal rituals can 
filter down to poorer members of the community.
Yartsa gunbu income insulates people from onerous funeral 
expenses that can lead families into debt. Providing a 
proper funeral ceremony is culturally appropriate and 
socially significant in Tibetan societies. Funeral rites assist 
the deceased person’s consciousness (rnam shes) navigate 
through bardo, the intermediary realm between death and 
rebirth. Failure to provide the full set of rituals can result 
in the consciousness becoming trapped in bardo or rebirth 
in a hell realm. One man explained that, in the past when 
a person died, members of the household would scramble 
to accumulate sufficient funds to sponsor ceremonies 
that stretch over the course of seven weeks. He recalled 
incidents where families had to sell livestock, jewelry, and 
even land to afford a proper funeral ceremony. Nowadays, 
yartsa gunbu income can provide the cash needed to 
perform last rites.
Many people in Sama expressed worries about negative 
developments associated with the yartsa gunbu trade, 
including a sharp rise in drinking. Instead of just drinking 
locally distilled beverages, which are limited in quantity by 
the amount of grain on hand, cash allows men to purchase 
cheap, potent liquor from China. The increase in drinking 
prompted Sama’s residents to form a Women’s Association  
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(Maili Samiti) that immediately took action by instituting a 
ban on Chinese liquor. According to their president, 
The reason [for the prohibition] is that Chinese 
liquor is very cheap. Therefore, people in the 
village drink a lot of it. People get drunk and get 
into fights. After getting drunk on Chinese liquor, 
men gamble day and night. When their children 
and wives get sick, nobody is around to take care 
of them. So we decided to form the association and 
do something about it. Most people in the village 
support this ban. Those who drink a lot complain 
that we have stopped them from getting the 
cheaper liquor. If you drink too much of the cheap 
liquor, you know it causes health issues and harm 
to your body. That is why we have banned the sale 
of Chinese liquor. 
Many people are unused to managing large amounts of 
money and end up spending their earnings very quickly. 
Gambling, which used to be confined to a brief period 
around the Tibetan New Year (January-February), is now 
common during and after the yartsa gunbu harvest. Bets of 
NRs1,000 ($12) or more—almost unheard of in the past—
are commonplace. As one man put it, “People who are 
actually poor act as if they are rich. They spend lavishly 
and want others to see them as rich.” 
Furthermore, when we asked a village leader whether yart-
sa gunbu is changing local lives, he responded, 
I can say there had been some changes; changes in 
the way people eat, drink and live. But the change 
is not proportionate to the economic boom. The 
changes are not evident in households or in the 
village in general. I guess it can be attributed to 
unwise spending. When the people of Sama travel 
outside the village, they spend a lot of money. The 
hoteliers down valley are happy to have guests 
from Sama because they spend a lot. They don’t 
know how to manage cash. 
One man was despondent over his son’s recent spending 
binge. After telling us that his family earned NRs250,000 
($2,940) from the previous yartsa gunbu harvest, he ex-
plained, “We put the money in a trunk. My son took that 
money and spent it all in a couple of days in Kathmandu. 
I could do nothing. If I question him, he will fight with 
me. So I didn’t say anything.” When we probed whether 
he thought other people squandered their yartsa gunbu 
income, he continued,
Take me for example. If I could collect 100 worms 
today, I would spend 500 rupees on drinking. We 
are not thinking right. Most of us are like that. 
There are many hotels around here where we 
get together and drink. But some people can save 
well. If your wife is smart, then you can save some 
money. People like me end up with nothing. We 
only think about the present and live life as it 
comes. 
A young, influential religious leader in Sama is concerned 
over changing cultural values and financial mismanage-
ment in his village and has organized advising sessions for 
young men where he counsels them to value traditions 
and use income in ways that can benefit their families. For 
example, he recommends they invest in appreciable assets 
like jewelry, and set aside funds to help children attain a 
Figure 5. Yartsa gunbu is 
the best source of income 
today in Nubri and Tsum.
(Geoff Childs, 2012)
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better education. Only time will tell whether people heed 
his advice. 
The boom in income from yartsa gunbu seems to be 
changing norms of social interaction. As one man 
commented,
The people of our village are peaceful in general 
but since the commencement of yartsa gunbu trade 
have become boorish. Earlier, we only had village 
meetings once or twice a year. Nowadays there are 
frequent meetings with more arguments between 
people, more squabbles. People are becoming more 
selfish. 
When we asked whether the sudden change in economic 
conditions is affecting inter-generational relations, an 
elderly lama responded, 
Things of the past are left behind. This is because 
of the huge income one can gain from collecting 
yartsa gunbu without doing much hard work. During 
our parents’ time our lineage was highly respected 
because we are descendants of the religious kings 
(chos rgyal) of Tibet.12 As we have aged we have 
continued observing the old values. Modern values 
are different. We don’t attend all the gatherings of 
the lay people. Their thinking is incompatible with 
ours (sems pa mthun mi ‘dug); our experiences and 
the things we have seen are different. Even if we go 
to the meetings, neither are [our ways of thinking] 
compatible nor do they listen to us. Therefore, 
it is better if we don’t go to these gatherings. 
Modern and traditional thoughts do not match. 
[Young] people here say, “There is no point talking 
about traditional thoughts. Leave aside the talk of 
traditions and let’s talk about who’s wealthier.”
According to this lama, the breakdown of both social and 
generational hierarchies is due to many people achieving 
upward mobility through lucrative activities that do not 
require much work, and by their use of newfound wealth 
as a sign of status (see also Yeh and Lama 2013: 10-11). He 
went on to lament that young people nowadays, 
[D]on’t show any respect, they say we are old 
people. The little respect I receive is primarily 
because I am a practitioner of Buddha’s teaching 
and people invite me to perform some religious 
activities. Other than that, there is no role for us 
in other [secular] matters. When I talk with people 
nowadays they all say, ‘you and me’ (khyod dang 
nga). 
Traditional Tibetan social norms are based on the concept 
of ‘order by seniority’ (rgan gzhon go rim), meaning that 
younger people should treat their elders with respect 
through deferential actions (giving them the most com-
fortable seats, serving them first) and verbal interactions. 
In Tibetan linguistic convention, honorific speech (zhe sa) 
refers to ‘speech whose very words show respect’ (Agha 
1993: 132). With respect to pronouns, ‘khyed’ and ‘sku nyid’ 
are honorific forms of ‘you’ that should be used when ad-
dressing a person of higher age or social status. In contrast, 
people of lower or equal age and social status are typically 
addressed using the term ‘khyod.’ To address an older la-
ma—a person who occupies the pinnacle of the local social 
hierarchy—using ‘khyod’ represents a linguistic rupture 
of traditional social norms. The lama interprets this as 
evidence that the youth are disregarding the traditional 
age-based social order.
In May 2013 we learned through interviews and 
participant observation that elderly community 
members no longer attend village meetings in Sama. 
Their reluctance is in response to disrespectful actions 
by young men who raise their voices and interrupt them, 
and devalue their traditional knowledge by claiming that 
time-honored regulations are no longer applicable. It is 
impossible to determine whether an erosion of the age-
based status system would have occurred in the absence 
of yartsa gunbu. What is clear, however, is that Sama’s 
younger generation gained sudden access to a lucrative 
income source. By doing so they become less dependent 
on guidance from the elderly, and seem less inclined to 
adhere to traditional social norms. 
Sustainable Development?
The World Conservation Strategy (IUCN et al. 1980) first 
highlighted the need for ‘sustainable development’, an 
approach to simultaneously address poverty, inequality, 
and environmental concerns (Hopwood et al. 2005). After 
the Brundtland Report defined sustainable development as 
“development that meets the needs of the present without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet 
their own needs” (WCED 1987: 43), the concept has been 
thoroughly debated, refined, and appropriated by different 
interest groups to fit various agendas (Hopwood et al. 
2005).
Haughton identified five interconnected ‘equity 
principles’ that, if “not addressed singly and collectively, 
then inevitably the ability to move toward sustainable 
development will be critically undermined” (1999: 235). 
The first, inter-generational equity, encapsulates the 
Brundtland Report’s definition of sustainable development 
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cited above. The second, intra-generational equity, refers 
to socioeconomic equity within a society at a given 
time. The third, geographic equity, “requires that local 
policies should be geared to resolving global as well as 
environmental problems,” whereas the fourth, procedural 
equity, advocates for regulatory transparency in which 
all individuals are treated fairly. Finally, inter-species 
equity is a call for maintaining biodiversity by treating 
the survival of all species on an equal basis with humans 
(Haughton 1999: 235-237). Although we do not have 
sufficient data to fully address all of these principles, we 
have enough to comment on inter-generational equity, 
intra-generational equity, and procedural equity.
Does the current rate of harvest of yartsa gunbu 
compromise the ability of the future generation to meet 
its own needs (inter-generational equity)? As Winkler 
points out, “Any resource of such immense value, and 
key relevance to rural livelihoods as the main cash 
source, runs the risk of being over-exploited” (2009: 
306). Rising commercial demand has spurred a sharp 
increase of collecting and, consequently, concerns over 
the sustainability of the yartsa gunbu harvest (Sharma 
2004; Cannon et al. 2009; Winkler 2009, 2012; Weckerle et 
al. 2010; Shrestha and Bawa 2013). Although insufficient 
data exists to track long-term trends with certainty 
(Winkler 2009), one study in Dolpa, Nepal, indicates a 
recent decline in the volume of yartsa gunbu gathered and 
a local perception that current collection practices are 
unsustainable (Shrestha and Bawa 2012). Importantly, 
Dolpa allows outsiders access to collection grounds. As 
a result, roughly 50,000 people ventured to highland 
pastures in 2010 in search of yartsa gunbu (Shrestha and 
Bawa 2012: 518). This mirrors a trend in other open-access 
areas where increasing competition reduces per capita 
yields (Winkler 2009). Although Winkler (2009) initially 
expressed guarded optimism that yartsa gunbu is resilient 
in the face of increased collection, he recently noted that 
competition has generated a worst case scenario in places 
where people extend the picking season beyond the time 
when yartsa gunbu reaches its peak value. Not only do they 
extract an inferior product with lesser market value, they 
reduce the number of spores that can be released to infect 
next year’s crop (Winkler 2012: 38-39).
Several scholars argue that community-based management 
practices can be effective mechanisms to ensure 
sustainability (Cannon et al. 2009; Stewart 2009; Weckerle 
et al. 2010; Shrestha and Bawa 2013). The absence of strong 
government presence has allowed the residents of Nubri 
and Tsum the autonomy to combine novel and traditional 
regulations that can potentially moderate collection 
intensity and ensure long-term sustainability of yartsa 
gunbu. Religious decrees prohibit collecting in certain 
sacred areas thereby ensuring that part of the landscape 
will remain undisturbed. Furthermore, regulations limit 
the number of collectors by excluding outsiders. In the 
case of Samagaun VDC, if we eliminate those locals who are 
unlikely to participate in the harvest (monks and nuns, the 
disabled, children under five, adults 55 and older, people 
who live elsewhere) and assume that parents can recall all 
children residing in boarding schools in Kathmandu, only 
Figure 6. Horsemen 
between Sama and 
Samdo, Nubri.
(Geoff Childs, 2012)
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400 of 780 VDC residents (51% of the population) would 
gather yartsa gunbu. In comparison, in Majphal, Dolpa 
District, where access is open to outsiders, Shrestha and 
Bawa (2013) counted 2,600 collectors—nearly double the 
VDC’s population. 
Is everyone treated in a fair and transparent manner 
under the rules and regulations governing yartsa gunbu 
(procedural equity)? Policies in Samagaun VDC are decided 
through public meetings in which issues are debated then 
resolved by consensus. Everyone from the wealthiest to 
the poorest household must adhere to the same starting 
date for gathering yartsa gunbu, a policy that is designed 
to facilitate equal access to the collection grounds. The 
daily roll call is done in public so everyone knows who is 
present in the village, and who is absent. Every household 
is beholden to the same level of taxation, and the use of 
revenue is decided by committee to fulfill agendas that 
benefit the entire community. Although some individuals 
no doubt try to bend or circumvent the rules, the yartsa 
gunbu regulation system is designed and administered in a 
manner that is meant to be transparent and equitable. 
Can the yartsa gunbu harvest reduce the gap between rich 
and poor (intra-generational equity)? Traditionally, wealth 
status was determined by a combination of ‘external 
wealth’ (byi’i nor; arable land and domesticated animals) 
and ‘internal wealth’ (nang gi nor; jewelry, sacred objects, 
and other valuable household items). Poor families 
possessed scant external and internal wealth, and stood 
little chance to acquire more. However, in the yartsa gunbu 
economy a poor family with a sufficient labor force can 
obtain substantial cash income. Thus, several people we 
interviewed commented that yartsa gunbu income makes 
life easier for everyone, including the poor. As a senior 
lama explained,
People are doing very well by collecting and selling 
yartsa gunbu. With this huge income, they can buy 
livestock, household goods and improve their 
lives. If this new business of yartsa gunbu had not 
happened, people would have to work hard like 
they used to do in the past by farming, carrying 
loads, and collecting wood. In the past wealthy 
people did not have to work hard physically while 
the poorer people had to go everywhere down 
the valley and up the mountains and work very 
hard to earn a living. These days, everyone has 
attained wealth and there is a leveling [of economic 
differences].
Although intra-generational equity appears possible under 
Sama’s harvesting regulations, the variation in income 
yields among participating households (NRs4,000–540,000) 
shows that outcomes are not uniform. Table 2 displays a 
positive relationship between the number of household 
residents and yartsa gunbu income. The same relationship 
also holds true between household size and traditional 
signifiers of wealth: land and cattle. Because households 
that are already relatively wealthy tend to have larger la-
bor forces, the yartsa gunbu harvest may be simultaneously 
improving everyone’s standard of living and increasing 
wealth inequity within the villages. This is a topic that 
merits further research. 
In conclusion, people across the Tibetan Plateau and 
Himalayan region are grappling with issues associated 
with yartsa gunbu: how to effectively manage a common 
resource, how to ensure equitable access, and how to deal 
with the sudden influx of income. They are confronting 
these issues using a combination of traditional regulations 
and novel ideas. The results are mixed. On the negative 
side, some areas have witnessed the degradation of 
pastures, turf wars and violence, discordant social 
relationships, and heavy drinking. On the positive side, 
yartsa gunbu provides an opportunity for people to 
improve their standard of living, start business ventures, 
enhance religious life, provide better education for 
children, and mitigate the economic burden associated 
with deaths in the family. Household-level improvements 
are being accomplished independent of state-sponsored 
development initiatives, and in the case of Nubri and Tsum 
management practices that were devised independent of 
state interference may prove to be sustainable over the 
long-run.
Household  
Residents
Number of 
Households
Yartsa Gunbu 
Income
Land in Local 
Units Bovines
1-2 41 NRs 61,390 19.7 ’bre 5.6
3-5 76 NRs 81,266 42.2 ’bre 12.3
6+ 16 NRs 152,656 58.2 ’bre 20.6
Total 133 NRs 83,727 37.0 ’bre 11.1
Table 2. Household 
Residents by Income  
and Economic Assets, 
Samagaun VDC.
Beall, Childs, and  
Craig ,2012 Nubri,  
Tsum, and Mustang 
Household Survey
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Endnotes
1. On the life cycle, geographical range, and history of 
collection of yartsa gunbu see Winkler (2008a, 2009), and 
Zhang et al. (2012). 
2. See Winkler (2012) for a critical review of press reports. 
Yartsa gunbu has been viewed as a sexual stimulant in 
Tibetan and Chinese medicine for centuries. Zurkhar 
Nyamnyi Dorje, a 15th-century doctor and scholar, 
composed a text describing the benefits of yartsa gunbu 
in which he wrote, “It bestows inconceivable advantages. 
Thus, it increases the Seven Bodily Constituents. Among 
these, particularly it serves best for the purpose of libido, 
increasing offspring and improving vitality.” (Winkler 2008b: 
32-36 contains the Tibetan text and its translation).
3. Tibetans from Qinghai report that bartering through the 
exchange of hand signals is an old practice, employed while 
haggling over animal skin prices with non-Tibetan traders, 
which may be related to the fact that sometimes sellers and 
buyers do not speak a common language. Furthermore, 
since most transactions take place in the open along 
roadsides, exchanging hand signals within sleeves ensures 
that other people do not know the prices which may be 
advantageous to the buyer (personal communications,  
July 2013).
4. Village Development Committees (VDC; Gāun Bikās 
Samiti in Nepali) are sub-district political divisions 
designed to link local communities and the state with the 
goal of improving the delivery of services. Control over 
local resources can fall under the purview of the VDC 
government, or can be usurped by larger organizations such 
as National Parks and Conservation Area Projects.
5. The 2011 research was supported by a Washington 
University Faculty Research Grant. The 2012 project, Genes 
and the Fertility of Tibetan Women at High Altitude in 
Nepal, was funded by the National Science Foundation 
(Grant No. BCS-1153911, PI Cynthia Beall, co-PIs Geoff 
Childs and Sienna Craig).
6. ‘bu gcig ’bru na dge slong gcig bsad pa ’dra bo yin/
7. See Yeh and Lama (2013: 6-7) for an insightful discussion 
of Tibetan moral perspectives on the yartsa gunbu harvest 
and environmental degradation. See also Winkler (2008b: 
29).
8. Yartsa gunbu collection grounds are managed by 
different entities throughout Nepal. In some districts, like 
Manang, the Conservation Area Management Committee 
is tasked with collecting fees, whereas in other areas 
permission to harvest is granted by the Department of 
Forestry, a National Park, a Buffer Zone User Group, or a 
Community Forest User Group (Devkota 2010: 95-96).
9. Prohibiting hunting and other disturbances around 
sacred mountains has a long history in the Tibetan world. 
One practice is territorial ‘sealing’ (rgya dom pa) that has 
two different but parallel traditions under the heading ri 
rgya lung rgya (‘sealing the hills and valleys’). The first is 
‘monastic codes of rights and regulations’, and the second 
is public decrees or laws by a ruler (Huber 2004: 133). 
Huber also describes local forms of sealing territory called 
ri khrims or ri rgya (‘laws on hills’ or ‘sealing of hills’) 
which are performed for two related reasons: to protect 
economically valuable resources such as game animals, 
timber, and medicinal plants, and to restrict activities that 
potentially disturb local deities.
10. The data presented in Table 1 do not constitute a 
complete economic picture. The residents of Lho have 
immense forest resources and regularly travel to Tibet to 
exchange timber for grain, wool, and other essential items. 
Residents of Samagaun, who have far less forest resources, 
use income from yartsa gunbu to buy grain and wool. 
Therefore, the economic disparity between the VDCs is not 
as large as Table 1 suggests. 
Geoff Childs (Ph.D. in Anthropology and Tibetan 
Studies, Indiana University) is an Associate Professor of 
Anthropology and Environmental Studies at Washington 
University in St. Louis who specializes in studying the 
interconnections between demographic processes, global 
connections, economic changes, and family transformations 
in the highlands of Nepal and the Tibet Autonomous Region, 
China. 
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majority of information on local policies in Tsum, Phurbu Tsewang 
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Sienna Craig for allowing the use of survey data from the 2012 
research project, Georgina Drew for insightful comments on an 
earlier draft of the paper, and the two anonymous reviewers whose 
suggestions greatly improved the final version of the paper.
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11. In fact there are a few other sources of cash income, 
including portering and occasional wage labor, so we 
presume he means no other that can compare in scale.
12. See Childs (2004) on the history of the prestigious 
Ngadag lineage in Sama.
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